THE GREENLAND AGREEMENT OF 22 SEPTEMBER 2026
A HISTORICAL, STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL-LAW ANALYSIS
The agreement between Denmark, Greenland and the United States, signed in New York on 22 September 2026, represents a substantial development in the defence arrangements that have governed the American military presence in Greenland since 1951.
It does not transfer sovereignty over Greenland to the United States. On the contrary, it explicitly reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Denmark and recognises the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination under international law.
Nevertheless, it provides for an expansion of American military activities, establishes extensive rights of access to Greenlandic territory and territorial waters, formalises security-related restrictions on certain foreign investments, and seeks to preserve the existing defence arrangements in the event of Greenlandic independence.
The agreement’s significance lies not simply in the prospect of additional American military installations, but in its attempt to establish a durable security framework capable of surviving a fundamental change in Greenland’s constitutional status.
The following analysis takes the authoritative English text as its primary source, read alongside the Danish version, the existing defence arrangements and the relevant principles of international law. It distinguishes the legal effects of the agreement from its possible political consequences and identifies the questions that remain unresolved.
1. The historical framework: from 1951 to 2026
The defence relationship between Denmark and the United States has developed through successive agreements reflecting changes in Greenland's constitutional status, the strategic importance of the Arctic and the wider international security environment.
The 1951 Defence Agreement was concluded during the early Cold War. It gave the United States extensive rights to establish and operate defence areas in Greenland, subject to the arrangements agreed with Denmark. These rights were connected to the parties' responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty.
Retsinformation
The Igaliku Agreement of 2004 modified this framework. It recognised Greenland's evolving political position, confirmed that Thule Air Base was then the only remaining American defence area, and preserved the arrangements governing the establishment of additional defence areas. It also clarified the application of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) to American personnel in Greenland.
Retsinformation
The 2026 Agreement does not replace these earlier instruments. Instead, it amends and supplements the Defense Arrangements, a defined term encompassing the 1951 Agreement, subsequent amending and supplementary agreements, and related non-binding arrangements.
The existing framework consequently remains essential to understanding the new provisions.
There is nevertheless an important constitutional development. The 2026 Agreement expressly recognises the Greenlandic people as a people under international law, possessing the right to self-determination, and refers directly to Section 21 of the Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009.
The agreement is therefore constructed around two concurrent principles: Denmark's existing sovereignty and Greenland's recognised right to determine its future constitutional status.
2. American military facilities and the development of Golden Dome
Article IV provides for the modernisation and expansion of American activities at Pituffik Space Base, as well as additional military facilities at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig.
The English text contains a noteworthy ambiguity. It refers to an additional Defense Area at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, employing the singular despite identifying two distinct locations.
It would therefore be imprecise to state that the provision unambiguously establishes two legally separate defence areas. Their precise status, geographical boundaries and technical arrangements remain subject to subsequent agreement between the parties.
The same article permits the establishment of further defence areas and the strengthening of American military operations or facilities. However, it does not give Washington an unrestricted right to determine their location and scope unilaterally.
Proposals for new defence areas must specify their location, size, activities and relevant mitigating measures. They are to be considered by the Permanent Committee, with implementation details determined by mutual agreement.
If agreement is not reached within 90 days, consultations are escalated first to deputy-ministerial level and subsequently to ministerial level. The text does not provide for automatic approval at the end of that period.
Golden Dome
The preamble explicitly identifies the establishment of a Golden Dome defence system as one possible means of defending Greenland, the North Atlantic Treaty area and the American continent.
This reference is significant, but it should not be mistaken for a fully developed operational agreement.
The substantive articles do not specify the system's architecture, funding, timetable or precise Greenlandic components. Nor do they establish an independent approval mechanism for Golden Dome.
Depending on the eventual configuration, relevant installations might be established through the expansion of Pituffik, the creation of additional defence areas or the provisions governing unmanned installations.
Because the preamble forms part of the context for interpreting a treaty, however, the explicit reference to Golden Dome may be relevant when the parties subsequently interpret the agreement's provisions on military access and infrastructure.
The agreement thus establishes a recognised framework for possible Greenlandic participation in Golden Dome without determining what that participation will entail.
3. Article V: Unmanned military installations
Article V provides for the establishment of unmanned military installations outside formally designated defence areas.
Denmark and Greenland are required to review requests for such installations under accelerated governmental approval procedures. Each proposal must describe the installation's location, scope, size, intended activities and mitigating measures.
The distinction between review and approve is essential.
The provision creates an obligation to process requests through an accelerated procedure. It does not grant automatic authorisation for every proposed installation.
Nevertheless, the ability to establish installations outside defence areas could have considerable practical significance. Depending on the technologies involved, such facilities might support surveillance, communications, early warning or other military functions without requiring a permanently staffed base.
Their precise nature cannot be established from the agreement itself.
4. Article VI: American access to Greenlandic territory and territorial waters
Article VI contains some of the agreement's most extensive operational provisions.
Its first paragraph grants American public vessels, aircraft, armed forces and vehicles the right of free access to and movement between defence areas through Greenland, including its territorial waters.
The provision is expressly connected to the secure and effective operation of the defence areas. Its extension to unmanned installations depends upon an agreement concerning the relevant arrangements at the time of establishment.
The second paragraph addresses overflight, landing and underwater access.
American aircraft may fly over and land in any territory in Greenland, subject to restrictions mutually agreed by the parties. The existing 1951 arrangements already provided substantial American aviation rights, so the new provision should be understood in that historical context rather than presented as the first authorisation of American military flying in Greenland.
Retsinformation
The special position of American submarines
The authoritative English text provides that American public vessels may have undersea access to and movement within the Territorial Waters, without restrictions other than those mutually agreed by the parties.
Two qualifications are important.
First, the provision concerns American public vessels. It does not extend the same permission to American commercial shipping generally.
Secondly, the expression may have is permissive. It authorises underwater access but does not employ precisely the same mandatory language as the right of free movement between defence areas in paragraph (i).
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to interpret the provision as requiring separate approval for each individual passage, given its express statement that restrictions must be mutually agreed.
The provision is significant in international-law terms.
Article 20 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea requires submarines and other underwater vehicles to navigate on the surface and show their flag when exercising the ordinary right of innocent passage through a state's territorial sea. The Greenland Agreement establishes a particular treaty-based permission for American underwater access that goes beyond that ordinary regime.
De Forenede Nationer
It does not, however, authorise every conceivable military activity at sea or establish American jurisdiction over Greenlandic waters.
The agreement also requires these access rights to be exercised with the greatest possible respect for Greenlandic society and its way of life, including hunting, fishing and other traditional activities. Their implementation is to be reviewed regularly by the Permanent Committee.
The result is extensive American operational freedom, accompanied by obligations to respect local interests and a mechanism for continuing consultation.
5. Articles VII–IX: Security, intelligence and third-country military activity
Article VII addresses the security of American defence areas.
The parties agree that nearby territory must not be used in ways that threaten those areas. The United States is entitled to raise concerns about construction or changes of use involving buildings, facilities and installations in their vicinity.
However, the provision requires the parties to determine jointly what measures may be necessary. It does not confer a general unilateral American veto over all surrounding land use.
The same article provides for cooperation against espionage.
Its drafting is somewhat asymmetrical. Although the parties undertake to work together, the express obligation to maintain close contact with American authorities is placed upon the relevant authorities of the Kingdom of Denmark. There is no corresponding provision expressly requiring the United States to provide Denmark and Greenland with an equivalent flow of intelligence.
That asymmetry should not be overstated: close contact is not synonymous with an unlimited intelligence-sharing obligation. It is nevertheless a difference in the wording of the parties' express obligations.
Article VIII commits Denmark to continuing to strengthen its security posture in the Arctic across land, maritime, air and space capabilities, including through improved surveillance and cooperation with NATO allies.
Article IX prohibits states outside NATO from establishing their own manned or unmanned military installations in Greenland or maintaining a persistent military presence there, unless the parties agree otherwise.
The provision is general. Although the preamble refers to increased military activity by adversaries, the operative article does not identify Russia, China or any other country by name.
It establishes a treaty-based restriction on military activities by non-NATO states, while preserving the possibility of exceptions by agreement.
6. Article X: Foreign investment and security-related economic restrictions
Article X extends the agreement's reach beyond conventional military cooperation.
It addresses states and investors from countries that are neither NATO members, NATO partners nor EU member states.
Such actors are not to be permitted control, significant influence or access to non-public information within particularly sensitive Greenlandic sectors or activities where this may constitute a threat to national security or public order.
The definition of particularly sensitive sectors is deliberately open-ended. It expressly includes critical infrastructure and resource extraction but is not limited to them.
This matters for Greenland's economic development.
The provision may have implications for investment in infrastructure, resource extraction, communications, energy and other activities that could be classified as particularly sensitive.
However, the agreement does not automatically prohibit every investment originating from a country outside NATO or the European Union. Its restrictive mechanism is tied to the specified forms of control, influence or access and the relevant national-security or public-order concern.
Moreover, it permits an exception where the parties agree that the activities concerned do not constitute such a threat.
Greenland is responsible for ensuring the objective through its existing or future investment-screening laws, in close cooperation with Danish authorities. Denmark must also engage in close consultation with the relevant American authorities and other partners.
The agreement does not transfer regulatory authority over Greenland's economy to the United States, nor does it confer a general American veto over every foreign investment.
Nevertheless, American agreement is relevant to the express exception mechanism. The United States would therefore have a formal role in determining whether a proposed activity may be accepted under that exception.
The resulting framework creates a possible tension between Greenland's economic development objectives and the parties' collective security priorities.
The extent of that tension will depend upon the interpretation of particularly sensitive sectors, the operation of the screening legislation and the consultation arrangements subsequently established.
7. Article XI: Permanence and the prospect of Greenlandic independence
Article XI is particularly important because it addresses the agreement's future in the event of a fundamental change in Greenland's constitutional position.
It states that the agreement has no end date and may be amended only by mutual consent, in accordance with Article XIII of the 1951 Defence Agreement.
It then requires the governments of Denmark and Greenland, should Greenland become independent, to ensure that the new Greenlandic state agrees to remain in NATO, applying for membership if necessary, and affirmatively assumes Denmark's rights and obligations under the agreement and the wider defence arrangements from the date of independence.
Several distinct legal questions arise.
7.1 Permanence does not necessarily mean that termination is impossible
The English text states that the agreement has no end date. It separately requires mutual consent for amendments.
Neither proposition is identical to an express rule that the agreement can never be terminated under any circumstances.
Article XIII of the 1951 Agreement concerns interpretation, review and modification, while Article XIV connects the original agreement's duration to the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Avalon Project
The new agreement should therefore be described as indefinite in duration, with express provision for amendment by mutual consent.
Its eventual termination cannot be assessed definitively from Article XI alone. Any such analysis would have to consider the entire defence framework and the relevant rules of treaty law.
7.2 Greenland's right to independence remains intact
Section 21 of the Greenland Self-Government Act provides that the decision on independence is to be taken by the Greenlandic people.
Following such a decision, negotiations are to take place between the Danish Government and Naalakkersuisut. An agreement implementing independence requires the consent of Inatsisartut, approval by referendum in Greenland and the consent of the Danish Parliament.
Independence entails Greenland assuming sovereignty over its territory.
Retsinformation
Article XI does not abolish or formally amend this procedure.
It does, however, create a present treaty obligation for Denmark and Naalakkersuisut to seek a particular outcome in any future independence settlement: the continuation of Greenland's NATO relationship and the assumption of the defence arrangements.
It is essential to distinguish this obligation from a direct commitment entered into by a future sovereign Greenlandic state.
7.3 NATO membership cannot be guaranteed by Denmark, Greenland and the United States alone
Article XI requires the parties to seek Greenland's continued NATO membership, expressly recognising that an application for membership may be necessary.
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for the accession of new members by unanimous agreement among the existing allies.
OTAN Texte officiel
A future independent Greenland's membership could therefore not be guaranteed solely through the present agreement.
There is also a geographical question: Article 10 refers to the admission of another European State. Whether a newly independent Greenland would fall within that formulation, and how the allies might address its position, would require further consideration.
The Greenland Agreement itself cannot resolve either issue.
The commitment in Article XI is accordingly an undertaking to seek continued NATO membership, not a guarantee that the organisation will confer or maintain membership on the desired terms.
7.4 State succession: Would the defence arrangements continue automatically?
This is the most complex international-law question raised by the agreement.
When part of an existing state becomes independent, its position under the predecessor state's treaties depends upon the applicable rules of state succession.
The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties distinguishes between newly independent states emerging from dependent territories and states formed through the separation of part of an existing state.
Article 16 establishes a so-called clean slate principle for newly independent states in the Convention's technical sense: such a state is not bound to maintain its predecessor's treaties merely because they previously applied to its territory.
Article 34, by contrast, establishes a presumption of continuity in cases of separation. Under Article 34(1)(b), a treaty that applied only to the territory becoming a successor state continues in force in respect of that state, subject to the Convention's exceptions.
Office of Legal Affairs
The 1951–2026 defence framework is directly concerned with Greenland's territory. Consequently, if Greenlandic independence were treated as separation and the continuity principle applied, Article 34(1)(b) would offer an argument for continued application.
But neither the classification of Greenland's independence nor the applicable rule of succession should be treated as settled in advance.
The historical importance of 1953–54
Greenland's constitutional history is relevant to this question.
The Danish constitutional amendment of 1953 formally integrated Greenland into the Kingdom of Denmark. In Resolution 849 (IX), adopted on 22 November 1954, the United Nations General Assembly acknowledged Greenland's new status, referred to its people's exercise of self-determination through elected representatives, and concluded that the provisions of Chapter XI of the UN Charter concerning non-self-governing territories should no longer apply to Greenland.
Digital Library
This provides an argument for treating a subsequent independence process under the Self-Government Act as the separation of part of an existing state rather than straightforward colonial decolonisation.
It does not conclusively determine the matter.
The legitimacy and significance of the 1954 settlement may be considered in light of Greenland's colonial history, the development of international law and the subsequent recognition of Greenlandic self-determination.
Furthermore, the 1978 Convention's technical definition of a newly independent state refers to the territory's dependent status immediately before succession, not simply to its more distant colonial history.
Office of Legal Affairs
The appropriate classification would therefore need to be established in the circumstances prevailing at the time of independence.
The limits of Article 34
The 1978 Convention is not directly binding upon Denmark, which is not a party. As of September 2026, the Convention has 23 parties.
United Nations Treaty Collection
Its provisions are relevant to this analysis insofar as they illuminate possible approaches to state succession or reflect customary international law.
The customary-law status of Article 34's general continuity principle is disputed.
In the Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project judgment of 1997, Hungary and Slovakia advanced opposing positions on the customary status of Article 34. The International Court of Justice expressly declined to determine whether that provision reflected customary international law, instead considering the particular nature of the territorial treaty before it.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Accordingly, it cannot simply be presumed that a future Greenlandic state would automatically inherit the defence arrangements.
A particular exception for foreign military bases
Article 12 of the 1978 Convention preserves certain territorial rights and obligations following state succession. However, Article 12(3) expressly excludes predecessor-state treaty obligations providing for the establishment of foreign military bases on the territory concerned.
Office of Legal Affairs
This is especially relevant to Greenland.
It means that the special territorial-regime principle in Article 12 cannot, by itself, establish the automatic continuation of the American basing arrangements.
The exception does not necessarily determine the operation of Article 34, which is a separate rule. But it prevents a simple argument that the defence arrangements must continue merely because they concern identifiable territory.
7.5 Article XI as an attempt to establish continuity
Against this background, the drafting of Article XI assumes particular significance.
The provision does not merely state that the defence arrangements will continue automatically.
Instead, it requires Denmark and Naalakkersuisut to ensure that a future independent Greenlandic state affirmatively assumes Denmark's specified rights and obligations, with effect from the date of independence.
The expression affirmatively assume points towards an active and explicit assumption of obligations rather than reliance upon tacit or automatic succession alone.
Article 10(2) of the 1978 Convention provides a useful parallel. Where a treaty purports to make a successor state a party upon succession, the provision takes effect under that article only if the successor state expressly accepts that status in writing. Article 10(3) also provides for participation from the date of succession, unless otherwise stipulated or agreed.
Office of Legal Affairs
The Greenland Agreement does not itself explicitly prescribe a written accession instrument, and the 1978 Convention is not directly applicable to Denmark. Nevertheless, the parallel helps explain the function of the requirement for an affirmative assumption of obligations.
Article XI can therefore be read as an attempt to establish continuity even if automatic treaty succession cannot safely be presumed.
7.6 Anticipating the strongest objection to continuity
Article 34(2)(b) of the 1978 Convention qualifies its continuity presumption.
It excludes continuity where application of the treaty to the successor state would be incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose or would radically change the conditions for its operation.
Office of Legal Affairs
Greenlandic independence could raise precisely such an issue.
The existing defence framework developed under Danish sovereignty, with Denmark responsible for Greenland's international relations. A fully sovereign Greenland would have a different constitutional and international legal position.
It might therefore be argued that independence would fundamentally alter the circumstances in which the defence arrangements operate.
Article XI addresses this possibility in advance.
By explicitly contemplating Greenlandic independence and requiring the continuation of the defence arrangements, it provides an argument that independence as such is not incompatible with the agreement's intended operation.
But the provision does not make the treaty immune from Article 34(2)(b).
That exception does not require a change to have been unforeseen. Other legal or factual consequences of independence could still be relevant, and any future assessment would depend on the applicable law and circumstances.
The clause is thus better understood as anticipating and addressing a possible objection to continuity than as eliminating it altogether.
Article XI seeks to combine three elements: a possible legal basis for continuity, a commitment to obtain the future state's affirmative assumption of obligations, and an express recognition that independence need not itself bring the defence relationship to an end.
This is an interpretation of the provision's legal structure. The agreement does not disclose the negotiators' reasoning, and it would be unwarranted to present this interpretation as proof of their subjective intentions.
8. Greenlandic economic interests, environmental protection and the legal status of American personnel
The agreement also contains commitments intended to benefit Greenlandic society.
Under Article IV(iv), the United States must award contracts relating to the establishment, maintenance, servicing, construction and dismantling of defence areas to Greenlandic suppliers to the maximum extent possible, taking account of their capabilities and ability to perform the contracts.
The parties also agree to update the diplomatic notes of 2020 concerning contracting.
This is a substantive treaty obligation, although it is qualified. It does not guarantee Greenlandic companies a particular contract value or a fixed proportion of American military expenditure.
The provision should nevertheless be distinguished from a merely aspirational statement: the words shall award, read together with to the maximum extent possible, impose a qualified obligation upon the United States.
Environmental protection
The preamble recognises the need to protect Greenland's environment and expressly reaffirms the relevant environmental arrangements established in 1991 and 2004. It also recognises the economic, social and cultural rights of the Greenlandic people, including interests relating to their land, traditional livelihoods and way of life.
These considerations also appear in the operative provisions governing military activities.
However, the 2026 Agreement does not itself establish a comprehensive new regime for environmental liability, remediation, compensation or independent environmental monitoring at future installations.
Such matters must therefore be assessed through the existing arrangements and any subsequent agreements governing particular projects.
Recognition of environmental interests should not be confused with the establishment of detailed mechanisms for their protection and enforcement.
The legal status of American military personnel
The agreement does not introduce a new, independent regime governing the criminal jurisdiction and legal status of American personnel.
Article 2 of the 2004 Igaliku Agreement expressly confirms that NATO SOFA has applied in Greenland since 1955. It also establishes that the corresponding NATO SOFA provisions supersede Article VIII of the 1951 Defence Agreement, while retaining certain other provisions of the original agreement as supplementary arrangements.
Retsinformation
The fact that NATO SOFA appears in a separate category of relevant NATO agreements in Annex 1 to the 2026 Agreement does not alter that conclusion. The Igaliku Agreement itself is expressly included in the defined defence framework.
Questions concerning American personnel must therefore continue to be considered under NATO SOFA and the applicable supplementary agreements.
9. Entry into force and outstanding questions
The agreement was signed on 22 September 2026, but signature does not itself satisfy the conditions for its entry into force.
Article XII provides that the agreement will enter into force on the date of a diplomatic note informing the United States that the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed by the Kingdom of Denmark together with Greenland.
Consequently, the agreement should not yet be described as fully operative solely on the basis of its signature.
Several matters remain to be clarified through implementation, subsequent agreements or further legal analysis.
The geographical boundaries and operational arrangements for the facilities at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig have not been determined in the text. Nor does it specify the concrete Greenlandic elements of Golden Dome, the scale of future American deployments, or the detailed restrictions that might be agreed for military access.
Similarly, the full practical consequences of Article X will depend upon the investment-screening framework and the arrangements governing consultation between Greenlandic, Danish and American authorities.
Environmental obligations, local economic benefits and the precise consequences of additional military installations will also depend partly on implementation.
Finally, the future operation of Article XI would have to be considered in the particular legal and political circumstances of any Greenlandic independence process.
These are not incidental details. They will determine how the rights and obligations established in the agreement operate in practice.
Overall conclusion
The Greenland Agreement of 22 September 2026 develops and extends the defence relationship established between Denmark and the United States in 1951.
Its significance can be understood through three interconnected developments.
First, it expands and formalises the scope of American military activities. It provides for additional facilities at Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, supports the expansion of Pituffik Space Base, establishes procedures for further installations, and authorises extensive military movement through Greenlandic territory and territorial waters, including a particular permission for underwater access by American public vessels.
Secondly, it embeds security considerations more deeply in decisions extending beyond military operations. The protection of defence areas, restrictions on persistent military activity by non-NATO states, and screening of investments in particularly sensitive sectors establish a broader framework for security-related cooperation.
Thirdly, it seeks to preserve that framework in the event of Greenlandic independence. Article XI requires Denmark and Naalakkersuisut to seek the future Greenlandic state's affirmative assumption of the defence arrangements from the date of independence. In doing so, it anticipates legal questions concerning state succession without conclusively resolving them.
The agreement does not transfer Greenlandic sovereignty to the United States. It expressly reaffirms Denmark's sovereignty and recognises the Greenlandic people's right to self-determination.
Nor does it confer unrestricted unilateral American authority over Greenland's territory, economy or political future. The provisions governing additional defence areas, security measures and investment screening retain important elements of mutual agreement and consultation.
Nevertheless, the agreement establishes extensive American military rights and creates obligations that may affect Greenland's future security, economic development and international relationships.
There is a distinction here between formal sovereignty and the practical freedom to exercise sovereign powers. A state may retain sovereignty while undertaking international obligations that limit the range of decisions available to it. The scope of those obligations, and the mechanisms through which they are implemented, are therefore central to understanding the agreement.
The agreement's defining feature is not a transfer of sovereignty, but the consolidation of a long-term American military and security role in Greenland, coupled with an attempt to preserve that relationship through a possible transition to Greenlandic independence.
Whether that continuity can ultimately be achieved will depend on future Greenlandic consent, the applicable rules of international law, NATO's membership requirements and the arrangements negotiated if Greenland becomes an independent state.
In historical terms, the agreement represents a further stage in the evolution of Greenland's place within the North Atlantic security system: from the bilateral Danish-American defence arrangements of the Cold War, through the recognition of Greenland's growing political authority, to a framework that expressly accommodates the possibility of a future sovereign Greenland.
Its lasting consequences will depend not only on the rights established in September 2026, but also on how those rights are exercised, how the parties implement their obligations, and how Greenland determines its constitutional and international future.
